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Refinancing Pressure and Earnings Management:  
Evidence from Changes in Short-term Debt and Discretionary Accruals  
 
ABSTRACT 
Refinancing pressure may entice a very specific form of managerial misbehavior on 
the part of borrowers.  Borrowers utilizing a greater amount of short term debt in one period 
may feel pressure to make their firms look as attractive as possible leading into the next 
period when refinancing may take place.  In other words, potential refinancing pressure may 
lead managers to manipulate earnings. We examine the relation between changes in debt in 
current liabilities (short-term debt) and discretionary accruals as an indicator of the 
propensity to manage earnings.  Our results show that (i) firms have higher discretionary 
accruals during periods of increased short-term debt, (ii) firms have higher discretionary 
accruals prior to the initiation of bank loan agreements, and (iii) both of these relations are 
influenced by a firm’s credit risk. 
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Refinancing Pressure and Earnings Management:  
Evidence from Changes in Short-term Debt and Discretionary Accruals  
1. Introduction 
Diamond (2004) shows that lenders avoid active enforcement of debt contracts when 
the costs outweigh the benefits of enforcement. Because lenders are more likely to monitor 
and enforce debt contracts when repayment or renegotiation is imminent, Diamond (2004) 
recommends that firms utilize short-term debt. Although increased lender monitoring may 
provide one benefit to various stakeholders of the firm, having significant debt coming due in 
the short term comes with inherent risks as well (Flannery 1986 and Diamond 1991). For 
example, firms may be denied debt renewal, may have to repay the debt before projects 
mature, may be subject to unfavorable new debt terms, or may have difficulty obtaining new 
financing – hereafter collectively referred to as “refinancing pressure.” Ultimately, the 
positive effects of increased lender diligence may not be fully realized if refinancing pressure 
negatively impacts managerial behavior. 
Our purpose in this paper is to explore whether managerial behavior is, in fact, 
influenced by potential refinancing pressure. More specifically, we investigate the relation 
between discretionary accruals and both changes in short-term debt and subsequent debt 
financing to determine whether potential refinancing pressure is associated with a decrease in 
earnings quality. Two conditions must exist for such an association to be expected. First, 
firms must have sufficient amounts of short-term debt that requires refinancing or must have 
expansion needs that require new financing. Second, firms must face some obstacle (either 
actual or perceived) to renewing or to obtaining new financing.1 In the existing literature, the 
ex-post influence of capital structure and the tendency to manage earnings prior to covenant 
                                                
1 Increases in short-term debt may be the result of previously issued debt currently maturing or newly issued 
debt or bank loans coming due within the year.  For ease of exposition we refer to all debt coming due within 
one year as short-term debt. 
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violations have been explored. Additionally, there is evidence that firms manage earnings 
prior to seasoned equity issues (e.g., Kim and Park 2005, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Teoh et 
al. 1998) and public debt issues (Liu et al. 2010).  We attempt to bring together these 
different strands of literature to determine whether refinancing pressures that are more subtle 
than covenant violations encourage the manipulation of accruals and whether such 
manipulation is affected by potential obstacles to refinancing.  
Our tests reveal several important relationships between debt financing and 
discretionary accruals. First, we show that higher pre-existing levels of short-term debt are 
associated with lower discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with the lender 
monitoring arguments of Diamond (2004) and others. Second, we show that firms with 
increases in short-term debt (our proxy for potential refinancing pressure in the following 
period) also have significant increases in discretionary accruals. Third, like Liu et al (2010) 
we find that firms that actually do seek new debt financing appear to engage in accruals 
management; however, the relationship between increases in short-term debt and 
discretionary accruals does not depend upon new debt issues ultimately occurring. Finally, 
we show that the relationship between discretionary accruals and both changes in short-term 
debt and subsequent debt financing is attenuated for firms that have investment grade debt. 
That is, firms that are more credit-worthy appear to feel less pressure to manage accruals 
(i.e., may face fewer obstacles) when they encounter potential refinancing pressure.  
Overall, our findings are important because they suggest that capital structure affects 
managerial behavior in ways that have not previously been identified. Our finding that firms 
issuing debt appear to manage earnings in the period leading up to the issue is consistent with 
recent research in the area of security issuance and earnings management. However, our 
finding that firms need not actually enter debt capital markets for changes in short-term debt 
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to alter managerial actions is particularly important because it supports the idea that the 
perceived environment and the resulting potential need to take action in the future may 
produce value-altering activities by managers.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present background 
information and discuss our hypothesis development in Section 2.  We describe our data 
selection process and empirical method in Section 3. We present and discuss our sample 
characteristics and results in Sections 4 and provide concluding remarks in Section 5.  
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background 
Our paper is directly related to two major research areas. The first area involves the 
debt covenant hypothesis, which focuses on the accounting choices made by firms that are 
likely to experience debt covenant violations (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). The debt 
covenant hypothesis suggests that if firms are close to violating debt covenants, they will 
choose accounting methods that shift earnings from future periods to the current period 
(thereby making violation less likely). Empirical evidence regarding the debt covenant 
hypothesis is mixed. Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) report that firms 
facing possible dividend covenant violations are more likely to reduce dividends than to 
make accounting changes. However, Dichev and Skinner (2002) observe that unusually large 
numbers of firms avoid debt covenant violations by reporting financial measures at or just 
above covenant thresholds, and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms have excessive 
discretionary accruals in the year preceding reported debt covenant violations. More recently, 
Stanley and Sharma (2011) examine financial statement misreporting and the use of bank 
debt.  They find that having bank debt is not adequate to either prevent or detect 
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misreporting, and that the presence of bank debt may actually provide incentives for firms to 
manage earnings.  
 A second strand of literature that relates directly to our paper involves studies that 
examine earnings management associated with security issuance. Kim and Park (2005), 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), and Teoh et al. (1998) show that firms tend to manage earnings 
prior to seasoned equity issues. They attribute such managerial misbehavior to the firm’s 
need to be attractive to equity buyers. Liu et al. (2010) document similar associations for 
bond issues and also show that income-increasing earnings management results in lower 
costs of public debt financing. Bharath et al. (2008) examine the relation between accounting 
quality and debt prices and find that accounting quality affects whether firms choose to raise 
funds in public or in private markets. Overall, the evidence in this area suggests that when 
firms know that they are going to have to raise new debt or equity capital, they may manage 
earnings in an effort to enhance their appearance to potential funds providers.   
Our purpose in this paper is to bring together these two strands of research and 
examine whether firms with the potential for refinancing pressure (as well as those that 
actually obtain external financing) are likely to engage in earnings management. As such, our 
paper could be viewed as building from Roberts and Sufi (2009) who find that there are 
negative consequences associated with alienating creditors. Roberts and Sufi (2009) show 
that firms that violate debt covenants experience large and persistent declines in future net 
corporate debt. They also find that violators (even those facing less favorable borrowing 
terms) rarely switch lenders, which limits their financing choices and compromises their 
ability to obtain credit. By extension, it seems reasonable to suggest that firms may be 
tempted to manage earnings when debt is coming due because they perceive that there could 
be negative consequences associated with appearing unattractive if they need to refinance, 
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even if they are not close to their debt covenant limits. This notion bridges the gap between 
the debt covenant literature and the current study. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The central question that we pose in this research is whether potential refinancing 
pressure (proxied by changes in short-term debt) is associated with discretionary accruals. 
Our first hypothesis, however, is related to levels of short-term debt. Diamond (2004) states 
that because lenders are more likely to monitor and enforce debt contracts when repayment 
or renegotiation is imminent, the existence of short-term debt should improve lender 
monitoring of firms. Further, Diamond (1991) and Flannery (1986) explain that the improved 
lender monitoring associated with the existence of substantial short-term debt should cause 
firms to misbehave less. If this is true in our setting, higher pre-existing levels of short-term 
debt should be associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. Stated formally (and in 
the alternate form): 
H1: The level of debt in current liabilities is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. 
 
As discussed previously, Kim and Park (2005), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Teoh et 
al. (1998), and Liu et al. (2010) identify the existence of earnings management leading up to 
seasoned equity issues and public debt issues. These papers suggest that the need to “look 
good” prior to obtaining external financing is an important driver of managerial misbehavior. 
The design that we employ in this paper allows us to investigate whether such misbehavior 
exists only in cases where debt financing actually occurs or whether the existence of 
potential refinancing pressure – as evidenced by increases in debt in current liabilities – is 
sufficient to alter managerial behavior.  It is also important to note that our empirical tests 
define “debt financing” as new bank loan financing rather than public debt issuance. We 
adopt this approach because bank loans are far more common, such that our results should be 
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generalizable to a larger cross-section of firms. Overall, our contention is that in addition to 
the pressures that exist when debt financing is imminent, the potential refinancing pressures 
associated with increases in short-term debt combined with the negative consequences that 
are associated with alienating creditors (Roberts and Sufi 2009) may be sufficient to cause 
managers to attempt to shift earnings into the current period. Hypotheses 2 and 3 follow 
directly from these ideas.  
H2: The change in debt in current liabilities is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals. 
 
H3: New debt financing is preceded by increases in discretionary accruals. 
 
Previous research finds that riskier firms face greater obstacles to financing (e.g., 
Harris and Raviv 1991, Leland 1998). Although we expect that refinancing pressures will 
affect discretionary accruals in general, we also expect that these relations may be influenced 
by the extent to which firms are able to obtain credit. Our proxy for credit-worthiness is the 
presence of investment grade debt. If changes in short-term debt and/or new debt financing 
impact discretionary accruals to a lesser degree for firms with investment grade debt, this 
would support our proposition that less risky firms face fewer obstacles to refinancing, and 
therefore may feel less pressured to manipulate earnings if they have obligations coming due. 
This notion forms the basis for Hypothesis 4. 
H4: The relationship between refinancing pressure and discretionary accruals is 
attenuated by the presence of investment-grade debt.  
 
3. Data Selection, Variable Definitions, Empirical Model 
3.1 Data Selection 
We begin sample construction by selecting all firms with positive total assets from 
Compustat for the ten-year period between 1996 and 2005 (inclusive).  This time period is 
our primary restriction because it covers the intersection of (a) the period for which Loan 
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Data Corporation Dealscan data are available and (b) the period preceding the global 
financial crisis period that radically impacted the lending market. For firms to remain in the 
sample they must have accounting data available on Compustat. Because merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity can inject significant noise into the calculation of abnormal 
accruals, we eliminate from the sample firm-year observations with merger activity identified 
by Compustat footnote 'AB' for net sales in the year in which we measure abnormal accruals.  
For firms with M&A activity in the prior three years (but not in the current year) we create a 
dummy variable to be used as a control variable in the regression analysis.  After deleting 
financial firms and firm-year observations with missing data on requisite variables, our final 
sample consists of 26,872 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Definition of Discretionary Accruals (DACC) 
Reported earnings are composed of cash flows from operations and accruals. GAAP 
allows accruals to mitigate timing problems and to achieve better matching of revenues and 
expenses when measuring corporate performance over year-long time intervals (Dechow 
1994).  However, as recognized by Dechow and Skinner (2000), a potential shortcoming of 
accrual accounting is that it creates opportunities for earnings management. Managers can 
exercise significant discretion in deciding the size of accruals, and therefore can use accruals 
to hide bad current period operating performance or to delay recognizing income until future 
periods.  Jones (1991) presents a model to decompose total accruals into non-discretionary 
and discretionary accruals.  The non-discretionary portion of accruals is driven by changes in 
firms’ operations, whereas the discretionary portion of accruals measures the discretion used 
by managers while reporting earnings.  Specifically, discretionary accruals measure the 
unexplained portion of accruals when a firm’s operational factors are used to explain total 
accruals.  Kothari et al. (2009) summarize various modifications of the Jones (1991) model, 
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and suggest further improvements to the measurement of discretionary accruals.  We use the 
Kothari et al. (2009) definition of total accruals as: 
ititititititit DepMTPStDebtCashCLCATA −Δ+Δ+Δ−Δ−Δ= ,    (1) 
where TAit is total accruals for firm i at time t, itCAΔ  is the change in current assets 
(Compustat item 4; hereafter “item” refers to Compustat item numbers), itCLΔ is the change 
in current liabilities (item 5), itCashΔ is the change in cash (item 1), itStDebtΔ is the change 
in debt in current liabilities (item 34), itTPΔ is the change in tax payable (item 71), and 
itDepM  is depreciation and amortization expense (item 14). All changes are measured from 
year t-1 to year t.2 
We run annual cross-sectional regressions of the following model for each of the 
Fama-French 48-industry groups to estimate the α and β coefficients3: 
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
itit
it
Assets
EBEX
Assets
PPE
Assets
ARSales
AssetsAssets
TA
εβββα +++
Δ−Δ
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
11
1 ,   (2) 
where ∆Salesit is the change in sales ( item 12), itARΔ is the change in accounts receivables 
(item 2), PPEit is property, plant, and equipment (item 7), and EBEXit is earnings before 
extraordinary items (item 18 / TAit). Like many previous researchers (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and 
Lys 2008), we include the last term in equation (2) to control for extreme levels of firm 
performance.   
                                                
2 Although it may initially appear that a mechanical relationship would exist between changes in short-term 
debt (i.e., debt in current liabilities) and accruals, the total accruals measure includes subtracting changes in 
debt in current liabilities (item 34) from changes in current liabilities (item 5, which includes accounts payable, 
current liabilities – other, debt in current liabilities (item 34), and income taxes). Therefore, on net, the change 
in debt in current liabilities does not appear in the total accruals equation at all. 
3 We obtain the 48 industry definitions from Ken French’s website.  Our results are robust to the use of 2-digit 
SIC codes to classify industries.   
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We calculate non-discretionary accruals as the fitted value of equation (2): 
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
ˆˆˆ1ˆ
−−−−
++
Δ−Δ
+=
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
it Assets
EBEX
Assets
PPE
Assets
ARSales
Assets
NDA βββα .   (3) 
Finally, we obtain the signed value of discretionary accruals as: 
it
it
it
it NDAAssets
TADACC −=
−1
.         (4) 
3.3 Empirical Model and Definitions of Independent Variables  
Our study focuses on discretionary accruals as they relate to changes in firms’ debt in 
current liabilities. In the following paragraphs we discuss the model that we use to test 
Hypotheses 1-4. Specifics regarding the calculation of all variables are provided in the 
Appendix. The model that we employ is as follows: 
 
DACC = ß0 + ß1ROA + ß2LTDEBT + ß3M&A + ß4PPE + ß5TA + ß6SALES_STD + ß7MTB + 
ß8BIG4 + ß9STDEBT + ß10Chg_STDEBT + ß11NEWDEBT + ß12INVGRADE + 
ß13INVGRADE*Chg_STDEBT + ß14INVGRADE*NEWDEBT + Year and Firm Fixed Effects  
 
 
Our control variables are based on Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) who suggest that 
five types of factors affect discretionary accruals: business fundamentals and operational 
characteristics, investment in internal controls, GAAP accounting choices, accounting 
conservatism, and auditor characteristics.4 Regarding business fundamentals and operating 
characteristics, we include measures of profitability, leverage, merger and acquisition 
activity, asset structure, and volatility of revenues. We measure profitability (ROA) as net 
income scaled by total assets and leverage as long-term debt scaled by total assets 
(LTDEBT). We control for prior M&A activity through an indicator variable (M&A) set 
equal to one if the firm was involved in any merger or acquisition activity over the previous 
                                                
4 Most of these measures have been identified as important determinants of discretionary accruals by other 
researchers as well [e.g., Dechow and Dichev (2002), Ball and Shivakumar (2006), Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2004), Givoly and Hayn (2000)].  
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three years. Francis et al. (2004) hypothesize that firms’ asset structures (e.g., intangible 
versus tangible assets) affect discretionary accruals. We control for differences in asset 
structure through PPE, defined as net property, plant and equipment as a percentage of total 
assets. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that large firms have more stable operations and 
less error in estimating accruals, and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) suggest that firm size is 
also likely to be associated with investments in internal controls. To control for these factors 
directly our model includes proxies for firm size (TA, log of total assets) and volatility of 
revenues (SALES_STD, standard deviation of sales over the prior five years).  
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) define conditional conservatism as the asymmetry 
between loss and gain recognition. They show that conservative accounting practices may 
result in increased abnormal accruals. Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2008) we use the log of the firm’s market to book (MTB) ratio as our measure 
of the degree of the firm’s accounting conservatism. We assume that the market’s assessment 
of value is accurate and comprehensive and that book value will be either high or low 
depending on the degree of accounting conservatism. If a lower book value is considered 
conservative, then a higher market to book ratio would reflect greater accounting 
conservatism and may be related to higher discretionary accruals. Finally, we control for the 
audit function with a binary variable identifying Big 4/5/6 audit clients (BIG4) and we 
control for GAAP accounting choice by (a) calculating discretionary accruals relative to 
industry (Fama-French) norms and (b) using panel data models that control for both year and 
firm fixed effects.  
 Regarding our test variables, our first two hypotheses require measures of short-term 
debt. Barclay and Smith (1995) and Johnson (2003) use debt maturing in up to three years as 
their proxy for short-term debt. In our context, however, the prime factor motivating the 
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management of accruals is the minimization of refinancing pressure resulting from the 
potential inability to renew debt or to secure new debt financing to replace debt that is 
coming due in the very near future.  For this reason we define the level of short-term debt 
(STDEBT) as debt in current liabilities (i.e., debt maturing in one year or less) scaled by total 
assets. We use the previous year-end value of STDEBT to test Hypothesis 1 and the change 
in STDEBT from year t-1 to year t (Chg_STDEBT) to test Hypothesis 2. If our predictions in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are correct, the coefficient for STDEBT should be positive and the 
coefficient for Chg_STDEBT should be negative.5 
In Hypothesis 3, we predict that discretionary accruals will be higher for firms that do 
seek new debt financing in the following period. We use the Loan Data Corporation 
Dealscan database to identify firms that initiate a new bank loan agreement (NEWDEBT) in 
the year following the year in which the change in short-term debt is measured. As indicated 
previously, we adopt this approach rather than limiting our definition to include only firms 
that issue new public debt (as in Liu et al. 2010) because bank financing is used by a much 
broader cross-section of firms.  If our prediction in Hypothesis 3 is correct, the coefficient for 
NEWDEBT should be positive. 
In Hypothesis 4, we suggest that the relationships between refinancing pressure and 
discretionary accruals may be affected incrementally by the credit-worthiness of the firm. 
More specifically, we suggest that firms with investment-grade debt may experience fewer 
obstacles to refinancing and, therefore, may feel less pressure to manage their accruals when 
they are facing potential refinancing pressure. We use a binary variable (INVGRADE) to 
identify firms that have S&P ratings of BBB or higher. Firms without S&P debt ratings or 
with ratings below BBB are classified as non-investment grade. Below-investment grade 
                                                
5 When we use the current (rather than previous) year-end value of STDEBT our results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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firms are considered to be relatively risky, and some types of institutional investors are 
prohibited from buying their securities (effectively limiting the firm’s financing alternatives). 
If our prediction in Hypothesis 4 is correct, the coefficients for INVGRADE*Chg_STDEBT 
and INVGRADE*NEWDEBT should be negative.6   
4. Summary Statistics and Multivariate Tests 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in this study. All continuous 
variables are Winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
outliers. Discretionary accruals are about –1.23% (mean) of firms’ assets, with a median 
value of -1.09%.7 Our sample firms have roughly 42% long-term debt and 4.5% debt in 
current liabilities, both measured relative to total assets. Approximately 80% of our sample 
firms are clients of large auditors, 13% of the firms have investment grade debt, and 14% 
initiate new bank loan agreements in the year following the year in which the change in 
short-term debt is measured. While the average change in short-term debt (0.1%) appears 
relatively small, at the mean total asset value of $2.2 billion this represents $2.2 million in 
obligations coming due. Our contention is that potential refinancing pressures such as these 
may be sufficient to influence managerial behavior. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for discretionary accruals and all 
of the independent variables that are used in our multivariate model. Correlations reported 
                                                
6 We make no specific prediction for the coefficient for INVGRADE by itself. In a fully interactive model, this 
coefficient would capture the marginal effect of credit risk on discretionary accruals when there is no change in 
short-term debt at all and no new debt issued. 
7 Like previous researchers (e.g., Cheng et al. 2012, Ashbaugh-Skafe et al. 2008, Hribar and Collins 2002) our 
mean discretionary accrual does not equal zero because our accruals models are estimated without intercepts. 
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with a single asterisk are significant at the 5% level (or lower). Discretionary accruals 
(DACC) are positively related to profitability and leverage, and negatively related to firm 
size and market-to-book ratio. Discretionary accruals are also lower in the presence of a large 
auditing firm, consistent with Francis et al. (1999), Myers et al. (2003), and others. 
Regarding our hypotheses, discretionary accruals are decreasing in the level of short-term 
debt, increasing in changes in short-term debt, and are higher during the year preceding 
initiations of new bank loans. While all of these univariate relations are consistent with our 
predictions, the significant correlations between our test variables and several of the other 
independent variables point out the importance of evaluating our hypotheses within the 
context of a multivariate model. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Initial Multivariate Tests 
Table 3 presents our multivariate analysis. Standard errors for all regressions are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clusters. Although we control for several 
observable firm characteristics in the regressions, there is still a chance that important 
missing characteristics exist. The omitted firm characteristics are captured in the error term 
of the regression and the error term will be correlated with the independent variables, causing 
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.  To alleviate the potential omitted variable bias, 
we include both year and firm dummies (i.e., year and firm fixed effects) in our regression 
models.  
The results presented in Table 3 suggest, consistent with previous research, that firms 
that are smaller, more profitable, and that have fewer tangible assets and greater revenue 
volatility have significantly higher discretionary accruals. Table 3 also illustrates that levels 
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of short-term debt are significantly negatively correlated with discretionary accruals and 
changes in short-term debt are significantly positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
The coefficients for Chg_STDEBT across all three models reveal that for every percentage 
point change in debt in current liabilities (scaled by total assets), discretionary accruals 
increase by roughly 0.16%. Furthermore, for a one standard deviation increase in debt in 
current liabilities (again, scaled by total assets), discretionary accruals increase by 1.05% 
(0.16 * 0.0659 = 0.0105). Overall, the results suggest that while lender monitoring appears to 
be more effective in the presence of short-term debt (Hypothesis 1), the potential refinancing 
pressures that are associated with changes in short-term debt do seem to encourage managers 
to manipulate accruals (Hypothesis 2).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that discretionary accruals will be higher for firms that 
subsequently issue new debt. Table 3 shows that the coefficient for NEWDEBT is positive 
and highly significant. This finding, which is consistent with the public debt findings of Liu 
et al. (2010), suggests that discretionary accruals are managed upward in advance of new 
bank loans. More specifically, the coefficient for NEWDEBT implies that current year 
discretionary accruals will be from 1.13% to 1.30% higher for firms that initiate new bank 
loan agreements in the following year, relative to those that do not. However, Chg_STDEBT 
remains positive and significant in these models as well.8 Thus, both potential and 
subsequently realized financing pressures contribute to managers’ decisions regarding 
discretionary accruals.  
                                                
8 When we interact Chg_STDEBT with NEWDEBT, both coefficients remain positive and statistically 
significant and the interaction term is not statistically significant. 
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Our final hypothesis predicts that the relation between accruals and both changes in 
short-term debt and subsequently issued debt will be influenced by a firm’s credit risk. Our 
proxy for credit risk is INVGRADE, which is equal to one (zero) for firms that have (do not 
have) investment grade debt. Table 3 shows that INVGRADE by itself is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that other measures in the model (e.g., firm size, market-to-book 
ratio, profitability, and leverage) collectively provide an adequate proxy for the main effect 
of credit risk. However, the interaction between INVGRADE and NEWDEBT is negative and 
significant, suggesting that for firms that do enter the debt market, discretionary accruals are 
significantly lower in the previous year if investment grade debt is present. Stated differently, 
managers of firms that enter into new loan agreements appear to feel less pressure to manage 
earnings if their credit risk is lower.  The coefficient for the interaction between INVGRADE 
and Chg_STDEBT is also negative, but is less significant (p<0.07). Overall, our conclusion is 
that the presence of investment grade debt decreases some of the obstacles to refinancing 
(i.e., attenuates the relationship between refinancing pressure and discretionary accruals), 
consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 4. 
4.3 Additional Multivariate Tests 
Our dependent variable in Table 3 is discretionary accruals calculated using the 
Kothari et al. (2009) version of the modified Jones (1991) model. As a sensitivity test, we 
use two alternative specifications. First, we use the discretionary current accruals measure 
employed by Liu et al. (2010). Second, we implement a performance-adjusted measure, as 
recommended by Kothari et al. (2004). In particular, we adjust a firm’s discretionary accruals 
by subtracting the discretionary accruals of a firm from the same industry that is matched on 
the basis of return on assets. When we estimate the models from Table 3 using these two 
alternative specifications, our results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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Hypothesis 2 and a portion of Hypothesis 4 primarily involve – at least implicitly – 
firms that have increases (as opposed to decreases) in short-term debt. Therefore, it may be 
reasonable to suggest that our tests of these specific hypotheses should employ models that 
are restricted to firms that actually experience an increase in debt in current liabilities from 
year t-1 to year t. When we estimate the models in Table 3 with this restriction in place, our 
inferences regarding the associated hypotheses are unchanged.  
Hypothesis 3 and a portion of Hypothesis 4 relate to the relationship between 
discretionary accruals and new debt issuance. In our primary tests, NEWDEBT is a binary 
variable that identifies firms having a new bank loan agreement in year t+1. As indicated 
previously, we chose this specification because bank financing is far more common than 
public debt issuance, thereby enhancing the generalizability of our models. When we 
increase the scope of NEWDEBT to include firms that have new public debt issues (as 
identified by Securities Data Corporation), our results are qualitatively unchanged.  
5. Conclusion 
 Firms face potential refinancing pressure when debt is maturing and when managers 
perceive that there may be obstacles to obtaining or renewing the debt once it comes due.  To 
enhance the possibility of debt contract renewal or of obtaining new financing, firms have 
incentives to project an image of strong financial health.  For some firms the easiest way to 
put forth that strong image is through accruals management. Using a sample of firms from 
1996–2005, we present evidence that firms are more likely to have high discretionary 
accruals when they have increases in short-term debt, implying that accruals management 
may be taking place in anticipation of debt refinancing. We find that this relation exists both 
for firms that subsequently initiate bank debt and for firms that do not. We also find that the 
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tendency to increase discretionary accruals in response to refinancing pressure is attenuated 
when firms have lower credit risk. 
The evidence presented in this study adds to a relatively new area in the finance and 
accounting literature involving the effects of debt maturity structure on accounting choice. 
Although the enhanced lender monitoring and enforcement associated with short-term debt 
has been touted by finance researchers as desirable, our study shows that increases in short-
term debt may induce a short-run negative incentive for firms to manage earnings. Future 
researchers in this area may wish to investigate the long-run ramifications of these 
managerial actions. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Name 
 
Variable Definition 
 
DACC 
 
Discretionary accruals (see equations 1 through 4) 
 
ROA Net income as percentage of total assets (Compustat (#172/#6) 
 
LTDEBT Percentage of long-term total debt relative to total assets at year t-1  ((Compustat #181 – 
Compustat #34)/#6) 
 
M&A =1 if the firm is involved in a merger or acquisition in the prior three years (Compustat 
AFNT#1); =0 otherwise 
 
PPE Tangible assets (Property, Plant, and Equipment) as a percentage of total assets (Compustat 
#8/#6) 
 
TA Total assets (Compustat #6) 
 
LogTA Log of TA 
 
SALES_STD Standard deviation of sales over the prior 5 years with a minimum of 3 years ((standard 
deviation of Compustat #12)/#6) 
 
MTB Market-to-Book ratio (Compustat(#25*#199)/(#6 - #181)) 
 
LogMTB Log of MTB 
 
BIGAUD =1 if firm is a Big 4/5/6 audit client (depending on time period); =0 otherwise 
 
STDEBT Percentage of short-term debt, defined as debt in current liabilities relative to total assets at 
year t-1 (Compustat #34/#6) 
 
Chg_STDEBT Change in STDEBT from year t-1 to year t 
 
NEWDEBT =1 if firm enters into a new bank loan agreement in year t+1, as identified by the Loan Data 
Corporation Dealscan database; =0 otherwise 
 
INVGRADE =1 if S&P rating is BBB or above; =0 if S&P rating is below BBB or unavailable 
(Compustat #280) 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Quartile 1 
 
Quartile 3 
 
Std Dev 
 
DACC -0.0123 -0.0109 -0.0552 0.0289 0.1032 
 
ROA -0.0354 0.0326 -0.0299 0.0748 0.3670 
 
LTDEBT 0.4176 0.4151 0.2472 0.5760 0.2084 
 
M&A 0.0036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0603 
 
PPE 0.2878 0.2198 0.0973 0.4252 0.2345 
 
TA 2200.097 163.399 33.385 865.670 8576.063 
 
logTA 5.2052 5.0962 3.5081 6.7635 2.2968 
 
SALES_STD 0.2150 0.1487 0.0813 0.2667 0.2158 
 
MTB 3.9416 1.9205 1.1635 3.3649 52.3507 
 
logMTB 0.6960 0.6526 0.1514 1.2134 0.9323 
 
BIG4 0.8022 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3984 
 
STDEBT  0.0454 0.0151 0.0003 0.0549 0.0766 
 
Chg_STDEBT  0.0010 0.0000 -0.0073 0.0071 0.0659 
 
NEWDEBT 0.1358 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3426 
 
INVGRADE 0.1267 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3327 
      
 
All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlations 
  
Variable 
  
 
DACC 
 
ROA 
 
LTDEBT 
 
M&A 
 
PPE 
 
TA 
 
SALES_ 
STD 
 
MTB 
 
BIG4 
 
STDEBT  
 
Chg_ 
STDEBT  
 
NEWDEBT 
              
ROA  0.051* 1.000           
LTDEBT  0.033* 0.132* 1.000          
M&A  0.007 0.003 0.026* 1.000         
PPE  0.047* 0.095* 0.298* 0.007 1.000        
TA  -0.013* 0.203* 0.429* 0.011 0.271* 1.000       
SALES_STD  -0.010 -0.098* -0.004 0.038* -0.232* -0.306* 1.000      
MTB  -0.016* -0.078* 0.048* 0.012* -0.121* 0.038* 0.034* 1.000     
BIG4  -0.019* 0.094* 0.162* 0.008 0.095* 0.472* -0.173* 0.071* 1.000    
STDEBT  
 -0.032* -0.019* 0.018 0.008 0.023* -0.078* 0.094* 
-
0.062* -0.149* 1.000   
Chg_STDEBT   0.105* -0.064* 0.072* -0.008 0.024* -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 -0.347* 1.000  
NEWDEBT  0.026* 0.084* 0.162* 0.003 0.074* 0.320* -0.071* 0.058* 0.147* -0.019* -0.024* 1.000 
INVGRADE  0.004 0.094* 0.244* 0.010 0.208* 0.556* -0.169* 0.117* 0.175* 0.027* -0.003 0.235* 
              
 
*denotes significance at p<0.05 
 
All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Multivariate Refinancing Pressure Models  
DACC = ß0 + ß1ROA + ß2LTDEBT + ß3M&A + ß4PPE + ß5TA + ß6SALES_STD + ß7MTB + ß8BIG4 + 
ß9STDEBT + ß10Chg_STDEBT + ß11NEWDEBT + ß12INVGRADE + ß13INVGRADE*Chg_STDEBT + 
ß14INVGRADE*NEWDEBT + Year and Firm Fixed Effects 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
 
Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0895* 0.0888* 0.0886* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.0282* 0.0281* 0.0281* 
 (0.007) (0.0001) (0.001) 
LTDEBT 0.0387* 0.0393* 0.0396* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
M&A -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (0.937) (0.929) (0.934) 
PPE -0.0756* -0.0754* -0.0758* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA -0.0196* -0.0196* -0.0196* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0016 
 (0.389) (0.357) (0.351) 
SALES_STD 0.0163* 0.0161 0.0160 
 (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) 
BIG4 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 
 (0.721) (0.798) (0.799) 
STDEBT (H1) -0.0488* -0.0498* -0.0501* 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
Chg_STDEBT (H2) 0.1569* 0.1572* 0.1602* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NEWDEBT (H3)  0.0113* 0.0130* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
INVGRADE   0.0024 
   (0.409) 
INVGRADE*Chg_STDEBT (H4) 
  
  -0.0455 
(0.074) 
 INVGRADE* NEWDEBT (H4) 
 
  -0.0074* 
(0.008) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0339 
 
0.0349 
 
0.0350 
 
 
All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
All models include firm and year fixed-effects. Adjusted R2 excludes firm-specific intercepts for fixed effect 
regressions. 
 
*denotes significance at p<0.05. P-values (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-
firm clustering, and are one-tailed for the four directional hypothesis tests.  
